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Summary
At the end of the 20th century, the territory of the countries that came into 
existence with the dissolution of former Yugoslavia became the grounds 
on which conflict of interest between global superpowers started to take 
place, particularly that between the USA and Russia. The manner in which 
the two rivaling giants attempt to secure their interests in the region differs 
immensely. On the one hand, the USA secured its involvement in the re-
gion by establishing itself as a mediator in ending the wars in the 90s (BiH, 
Kosovo) and this grip got even stronger with the help of the so-called Eu-
ro-Atlantic integrations and inclusion of the newly formed Balkan coun-
tries into NATO (Slovenia, Croatia, Albania). On the other hand, Putin’s 
Russia pulls leverage through energetic projects in Serbia, Montenegro and 
BiH. The most obvious culmination of the Russo-American diplomatic 
conflict in the region occurred in Montenegro, which escaped the sphere 
of Russian influence following a series of affairs involving Russian secret 
agencies, much to the benefit of the USA. After the incident Russia started 
exert its corruptive influence and set boogey-traps for „Western” initiatives 
aimed at political stabilization at the region. This spoiling influence (BiH, 
Kosovo, Macedonia) has as its agenda the strengthening of Russian geopo-
litical influence in Europe, destabilized through the Ukranian crisis and 
the annexation of Crimea.
Key words: former Yugoslav territory; great powers; NATO; Russia; Rus-
so-American influence; Southeast Europe.
Historical continuity of conflict between big powers and civilizations 
on the territory of former Yugoslavia
The part of Eastern Europe consisting of former Yugoslav member-states Croatia, Slo-
venia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, with Albania in ad-
dition, has been a place of unyielding conflict between civilizations and geopolitical 
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great powers. Since the division of the Roman Empire into its western and eastern 
part in 395 AD, the region has been marked by a certain kind of fissure. In the Early 
Middle Ages, it functioned as the border and the place of contact between the Frankish 
and the Byzantine Empire. Its demarcatory quality was further strengthened by the 
Great Schism of 1054, when it became the boundary that separated the realms of the 
Catholic and the Orthodox Church and with it the cultural and civilizational frontier 
between the Eastern and the Western Europe. From the 15th century onwards, with 
the Ottoman invasion of Europe and its destructive consequences, the region retained 
its separatory capacity and functioned as the border between the Habsburg Monar-
chy, i.e. the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire until the early 20th 
century. Then, in the 20th century, the region justified its former notorious nickname 
„the powder keg of Europe” when in 1914 the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian 
Archduke and Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand and his wife1 took place in Sarajevo, 
modern BiH.
The event prompted Austria-Hungary to declare war on Serbia, which in turn trig-
gered a chain activation of intra-European alliances and the WWI. After the great 
war, the region reunited as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later renamed 
to Kingdom of Yugoslavia, a monarchy under the rule of the Serbian king Aleksandar 
Karađorđević, which existed as such until 1941. With the end of WWII, the commu-
nist Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was established under the totalitarian rule 
of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Josip Broz Tito as its lifetime president. In 
1948 Tito broke his ties to the Soviet Union and Stalin, masterfully maintaining diplo-
matic relations with both the Eastern and the Westers Block, thus simultaneously pro-
viding Yugoslavia with international help and cheap loans from the West and keeping 
Soviet influence at bay. Soon after Tito’s death in 1980 the territory of Yugoslavia suf-
fered destabilization. The then federal communist republics of Croatia and Slovenia 
expressed their secessionist sentiments and proclaimed independence. Ultimately, in 
1991 a bloody war broke out on the territory of contemporary Croatia and in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina soon thereafter. The belligerent 1990’s on the former Yugoslav terri-
tory were marked by the external political vacuum. The USA was preoccupied with its 
war in Iraq, while Russia faced internal political turmoil following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. The European Community, disunited and lacking coherent 
external policy, proved incapable of solving the bloodiest armed conflict in Europe 
since the end of WWII. 
Although the region currently functions as a complex network in which influences of 
various external actors intertwine, among them the EU, NATO, China and Turkey, this 
1 The Archduke Franz Ferdinand was murdered on 28 June 1914 by Gavrilo Princip, member of the 
clandestine Bosnian-Serb nationalist-terrorist organization Young Bosnia.
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paper focuses on two global powers, the USA and Russia, whose mutual relations and 
influences on the region have been most consequential since the end of the 20st century.
The USA’s mighty comeback
With the election of Bill Clinton as the new American President in 1992, the territory 
of former Yugoslavia re-entered the focus of American foreign policy. At the time, 
chaos reigned in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Croatian Serbs attempting 
to occupy big chunks of Croatian territory and unite it with Serbia proper and with 
all three of Bosnia’s current constitutive nations, Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks warring 
against each other.
With no treaty negotiations in sight and the UN peacekeeping missions in Croatia 
and BiH only maintaining the status quo, the Serbs amassed an increasing amount of 
the BiH territory, as well as enough arms to actually only profit from the embargo on 
arms import imposed by the international committee. The geopolitical situation start-
ed to change only with the intervention of the USA and the 1994 Washington Treaty2 
effectively ended the Croat-Bosniak war in BiH. This allowed Croatia to launch two 
offensive military operations in May and August 1995, in which the rebelled Croatian 
Serbs were defeated. A united Croato-Bosniak offensive in BiH followed later that year. 
Although in July 1995 the world witnessed the tragic Srebrenica massacre3 committed 
by the Bosnian Serbs against the Bosniaks, under the patronage of the USA in Novem-
ber 1995 the Dayton Agreement4 was signed that finally ended the conflict in BiH.
This mighty American intervention provided a huge milestone for the future of 
American influence on the territory of former Yugoslavia, which was further fortified 
in 1999 with the conclusion of the Serbo-Albanian conflicts on Kosovo through direct 
intervention of NATO’s Operation Allied Force5 and the bombardment of the Federal 
2 The Washington Treaty (signed on 18 March 1994) was a peace treaty signed between the Bosnian 
Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, i.e. the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia with the me-
diation of the American President Bill Clinton.
3 The massacre of Srebrenica took place from 13 – 19 July 1995 and consisted of brutal executions of 
8000 Bosniak men and boys. It was carried out by the Army of Republika Srpska under the command 
of general Ratko Mladić.
4 The Dayton Agreement (1 – 21 November 1995 )was a peace treaty among Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats 
took place the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, USA, under the supervision of the 
chief American negotiator Richard Holbrooke.
5 Operation Allied Force was the name of the military operation undertaken by NATO against the 
then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (federal union of Serbia and Montenegro) in order to stop the 
commenced genocide against the Kosovo Albanians. Due to the opposition of Chinese and Russian 
representatives in the UN, the operation was conducted by NATO instead of the UN. It effectively 
ended armed conflicts and the arrival of KFOR-forces drew the Serbian forces out of Kosovo.
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Republic of Yugoslavia. Russia quite weak at the time and without an active prospect 
to counter the allied military operations. Russian foreign policy since the dissolution 
of the USSR is frequently divided into the time before and the time after the rise to 
power of Vladimir Putin. The period in which it coincided with the Yugoslav Wars is 
described as the period of idealism and pragmatism of Boris Yeltsin’s (Sakwa, 2007). 
The end of 1990’s is characterized by external political pragmatism embodied in Rus-
sia’s diplomatic efforts to solve the existing problems on the Balkans through by sup-
porting Serbia and opposing external military interventions on the one hand, and the 
absence of a more determined and downright action on the other hand. An example of 
this is the „Primakov’s Loop” of March 1999, an action of the former Prime Minister of 
Russia Yevgeny Primakov, who expressed his symbolic protest against NATO’s opera-
tion against the FR Yugoslavia by cancelling his visit to Washington and returning to 
Moscow. Equally indicative is the unorganized and unannounced deployment of Rus-
sian KFOR-forces from BiH to Kosovo and their subsequent seizure of the Priština air-
port in June 1999 (Jelavić, 2000: 187), which was done in response to the distribution 
of NATO’s forces throughout Kosovo in spite of Russia not having been involved in the 
peace negotiations between NATO and Serbia. A deployment of international KFOR 
military forces followed, ultimately paving the way for the proclamation of Kosovo’s 
independence in 2008, which turned that country in yet another focus of American 
influence. The 2000 resignation and the subsequent 2001 arrest of Slobodan Milošević 
ensued. This series of highly consequential military and diplomatic interventions on 
the territory of former Yugoslav member-states determined the final balance of power 
in the geopolitical context concerning the region. Also Kosovo crisis and sequence of 
events will later be described as humiliation to Russia (Bechev, 2019: 7).
Euro-Atlantic integrations as a lever for the influence of American 
foreign policy
The next step was the American support for and the intention to include all former 
Yugoslav member-states into the so-called Euro-Atlantic integrations. The first of 
those actions took place in 2003, when Slovenia became a NATO member together 
with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. In the same year 
Slovenia joined the EU.
Apart from the action plan for NATO membership, the remaining former Yugo-
slav member-states, that were politically and socially exhausted by the Yugoslav Wars 
and undergoing slow transition, were included in the Adriatic Charter by the USA. 
The charter was signed in 2003 in Tirana and solidified the partnership of Croatia, 
Albania and Macedonia with the USA. Its purpose was to provide American aid in the 
attempts to include those countries into the Euro-Atlantic Integrations. The Charter 
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was joined by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in 2008, while Serbia was giv-
en the observer status. This way, the whole former Yugoslav territory was united in the 
prospect of entering NATO. In 2009 Croatia and Albania became full members of the 
organization, while Macedonia6 was prevented from doing so due to its bilateral dis-
pute with Greece over the name, despite having fulfilled the entry conditions. In 2012 
the Republic of Kosova gained the observer status within the Charter. This way, the 
whole territory of former Yugoslavia was united under the prospect of joining NATO.
The reception of former Yugoslav member-states into the Euro-Atlantic Integra-
tions and subsequently the EU was the modus operandi for exerting the American 
influence and „stabilizing” the region. Although the same principle was applied in 
case of every post-communist state (from Poland to Hungary), so that they first joined 
NATO and then the EU, in the region shook and destabilized by the Yugoslav Wars 
the process could not take place with the same dynamic and speed. Apart from the 
already mentioned factor of war, there was a strong influence of Russian interests on 
the territory of Serbia, Montenegro and BiH.
The Russians with anxiety observed the ex-Yugoslav member states’ joining NATO 
and the gradual encircling of the Adriatic Sea by NATO members (Italy, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Albania). The last country that remained beyond NATO’s control was Mon-
tenegro. In 2006, despite its internal political affairs and uneasy surroundings due to 
the high percentage of Serbian minority,7 Montenegro, in which Russian capital was 
strongly present, especially in its tourist and real-estate sector, managed to proclaim 
its independence from Serbia and thus begin its own voyage toward the Euro-Atlantic 
Integrations. Apart from leaving the grip of Serbia, this new direction of Montenegro’s 
foreign policy had distancing from Russia as one of its consequences.
Montenegro was of special significance to Russia thanks to its geostrategic lo-
cation on the Adriatic Sea, which spoke to Russian predilections of extending their 
influence to the Adriatic shores.8 In 2013 the Russians allegedly tried to realize 
that interest by making a request to Montenegrin authorities for access to the ports 
of Bar and Kotor (Secrieru, 2019: 3). However, in 2015 it came to a turning point 
when Montenegro finalized the fulfilling of the conditions for joining NATO. In 
the same year the small Balkan country witnessed an alleged unsuccessful Russian 
coup d’etat.
6 Macedonia, one of the former Yugoslav member-states, is recognized by the Republic of Croatia 
under that name, yet due to Greek opposition to its usage the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia was used in international institutions until January 2019, when the Prespa Agreement between 
Greece and FYR Macedonia ruled out the name change into Republic of North Macedonia.
7 According to the 2011 census, Serbs make up 28,73% of the country’s population.
8 The Albanian military base of Pashaliman used to be the only Soviet military base on the Adriatic 
Sea until 1961, when Albania left the Warsaw Pact.
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Russia’s role in the alleged unsuccessful coup d’etat with the attempt 
to prevent Montenegro’s entry into NATO 
Despite the absence of Russia’s opposition to Croatia’s and Albania’s entry into NATO, 
in case of Montenegro’s its reaction was quite different. The Montenegrin authori-
ties blamed Serbia and Russia when in October 2015 the members of opposition and 
pro-Russian oriented politicians of Serbian pedigree instigated demonstrations against 
the country’s accession into NATO. Furthermore, after Montenegro had been official-
ly invited to join the organization in December 2015, Serbian opposition parties in the 
country, provided with Russian political support, demanded a referendum (Bechev, 
2018: 9; Beckmann-Dierkes, 2018: 34). 
The boiling point was reached in October 2016, when Montenegrin authorities ac-
cused Russia and Serbia of participating in a conspiracy that involved a military coup 
organized by the former gendarmerie commander of Serbian nationality. The accused 
Serbian Prime Minister Vučić denied the allegations of Serbian involvement in the 
incident, yet simultaneously admitted that the territory of Serbia housed a group of 
militants aided by foreign intelligence agencies with the aim of assassinating the Mon-
tenegrin president (Bechev, 2018: 10–11). In 2017 a special investigator made a direct 
accusation against Russia, citing an attempted coup d’etat by the Russian intelligence 
agency GRU as its grounds. Regardless of the real extent of Moscow’s involvement 
in the affair, the incident clearly displayed the boundaries of Russia’s presence in the 
political situation of Serbia and Montenegro (Bechev, 2017). Nevertheless, Montene-
gro officially become NATO member on 5 June 2017. During his visit to Montenegro 
in August 2017, US Vice-President Mike Price described Russia as an „unpredictable 
country that casts a shadow from the east,” directly accusing it of a coup attempt: 
„Russia has worked to destabilize the region, undermine your democracies and divide 
you from each other and from the rest of Europe” (Chan, 2017). 
A year and a half of trials ensued, until in May 2019 the High Court in Podgorica 
ruled out that the 12 defendants be sentenced to prison due for attempted coup that 
ought to have prevented Montenegro’s joining NATO. Of that number, two Russian 
agents were sentenced in absentia to 12 years in prison and two politicians from the 
opposition parties close to the Belgrade regime received 5 years in prison. The High 
Court determined that their trips to Moscow were undertaken in order to receive in-
structions from the GRU agents to depose the regime in Podgorica. In its verdict, the 
Court stated that the group attempted to overtake the Parliament on the day of the 
scheduled October 2016 elections, as well as to assassinate the Prime Minister Milo 
Đukanović and install a pro-Russian government (Walker, 2019). Serbian opposition 
accused the Montenegrin regime of making up and fabricating the whole case. 
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Although the circumstances around the alleged coup d’etat remain unclear and it is 
possible that it didn’t happen in the exact way as it was portrayed by the Montenegrin 
authorities, there are indications that Russian intelligence agency was involved in it 
(Bieber, 2020: 94-95). Apart from the accusation of hacking the 2016 USA Presiden-
tial Elections and poisoning Sergey and Yulia Skripal in 2018, this was the third large 
scandal that tackled the GRU agents’ disruptive activities. 
Energetics as the main instrument of Russian influence
Despite having been involved in all 1990’s UN missions in former Yugoslavia, from 
Croatia 1992 – 1995 as part of the UNPROFOR forces (around 1 000 peacekeepers) to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996 – 2003 as part of SFOR forces (around 1 200 peacekeep-
ers), to Kosovo 1999 – 2003 as part of the KFOR forces (around 3 150 peacekeepers), 
in 2003 Russia militarily retreated from the area and left the peacekeeping operations 
to the EU and NATO. This was the time when Vladimir Putin seized power in Russia, 
when the country’s foreign political direction started to change and with it the focus 
of Russian interests in the region. (Secireu, 2019: 2–3).
Energetics became new instrument of Russian infiltration to the ex-Yugoslav terri-
tory, with the Russian state-owned energetic companies making strategic investments 
in the region. For example, in 2003 LUKoil bought 75% of shares of Beopetrol, the 
second-largest Serbian oil company. In 2005 a Russian oligarch bought an aluminum 
factory in Montenegro. Likewise, in 2007 Zarubezhneft took over both oil rafineries in 
BiH, the one in Bosanski Brod and the other in Modrica, and purchased the Banjaluka 
Petrol Trading Company (Bechev, 2015). Also, Gazprom Neft took over the majority of 
shares in NIS (Oil Industry of Serbia), the largest Serbian oil company. This way Russia 
obtained a monopoly in the oil and gas sectors in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovin.
Although geopolitically and strategically extremely important, this move did not 
bring Russia significant financial profit. For example, both BiH refineries were doing 
business with significant losses, which may point to financial profit having been sec-
ondary to strategic and geopolitical interests behind these Russian investments (Se-
cireu, 2019: 2–3). Although the impression may not be such, apart from energetics and 
the spread of the Russian Sberbank and VTB across the Balkans, in terms of its eco-
nomic influence in the region, Russia was incomparably weaker than the EU, which 
was illustrated by its poor economic indicators (import – export) not surpassing 5% 
for 2018 (Eurostat, 2019). 
The unprofitability, limitation and focus of Russian investments on energetics may 
be observed as part of a wider Russian plan to establish control over the new gas transit 
routes to Europe (Secireu, Bieber and Tzifakis, 2019: 11). Aware of that, Macedonia and 
Serbia had even before displayed an interest in becoming a part of TurkishStream, a 
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pipeline bringing gas via Turkey into Hungary envisaged for 2014, but terminated due 
to the dispute between Turkish authorities and Gazprom due to the gas prices (Bechev, 
2015). Nevertheless, the whole region remained part of Russian plans as one of the key 
points for establishing an alternative gas pipeline route toward Europe. 
One of such plans was the SouthStream, announced in 2007, which foresaw the 
construction of a pipeline that was supposed to go through the Black Sea, Bulgaria 
and Serbia to Slovenia and Hungary. Curiously enough, the SouthStream was offered 
to Croatia as well, even with the prospect of installing the section of the main pipeline 
in the country, which could therefore have benefited from the transit, but the offer 
was ignored by the Croatian authorities and with it the opportunity was missed, since 
after the country expressed its interest in the project later on, the offer was reduced to 
the installment of a branch that could be connected to the Serbian portion of the main 
pipeline (Biočina, 2012). The project later caused dissatisfaction among the heads of 
European politics, who believed that it would make the Balkans too dependent on the 
Russian gas, which would be transported through pipelines „in BiH, Croatia, Monte-
negro and Macedonia. The project was described as another Russian strategic move 
with the purpose of strengthening their influence over the region. It was ultimately 
abandoned in 2014, partly because of European sanctions imposed on Russia due to 
the Ukrainian crisis (Barber, 2015). In 2017 interest was expressed for the restoration 
of the project in form of 2 TurkishStream pipelines”.
The game of powers
Russo-American influence on Croatia and Slovenia 
Apart from Serbia, Montenegro and BiH, which were located within the so-called 
„Russian sphere of interest”, the Russians expressed their interest in purchasing the 
majority of shares in the main Croatian oil company INA. However, the move pro-
voked a strong reaction on part of the USA, with the American ambassador in Croatia 
Robert Kohorst stating that „the Russians aren’t partners we’d like to see in INA. I 
think that they have been a disruptive force in the region in past years, with INA 
and Croatia needing a better quality partner” (Biočina, 2018). A sharp response of 
the Russian ambassador Azimov followed, but eventually no Russian investment or 
acquisition in Croatia was made. 
The blockade of Russian interests in Croatia as exemplified in the cases of INA and 
the SouthStream is hardly an isolated case. The investment project Druzhba Adria, 
with which the Russians intended to gain access to the Croatian oil pipeline JANAF and 
thus export Russian oil to the global market was announced in 2010, but spectacularly 
failed. From this it may be concluded that Croatia is less than enthusiastic about the 
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introduction of Russian capital into its territory, especially through energetics projects, 
a stance that enjoys an obvious American encouragement. The Three Seas Initiative9 
project may be observed from the same standpoint. The initiative was started in 2015 
by the Croatian president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović and intended as an informal polit-
ical platform Adriatic – Baltic – Black Sea with the purpose of strengthening regional 
politics, economy, traffic routes, safety and cooperation. It stressed as its first main 
project the construction of an alternative supply route of liquefied gas, which would be 
transported to the LNG-terminal on the Island of Krk, Croatia, and then transported 
through a new pipeline that would be connected to the already built Polish terminal 
(Altaras Penda, 2018; The Three Seas Initiative, 2018). The project, which was designed 
as a direct competition to the Russian gas transport routes expectedly faced Ameri-
can support and its strategic goal was to prevent Russian influence by segregating a 
tampon-zone consisting of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova from the Russian sphere of 
interest and maintaining an anchor on the Caucasus in Georgia (Kurečić, 2017). 
Such policy helped Croatia to become one of the most powerful American confi-
dants among the former Yugoslav member-states. Croatia definitely obtained this sta-
tus when it was received into NATO in 2009 in the company of Albania. The presence 
of American interests in the region behind this decision were apparent and Croatia 
enjoyed unrestrained support on its way into NATO. The strength of this support 
and the American geostrategic interests were evident from the so-called unsuccessful 
Slovenian blockade. Slovenia, namely, with which Croatia still has numerous terri-
tory and border disputes, attempted to prevent Croatian entry into NATO. During 
the ratification process in the Slovene Parliament, members of the political opposi-
tion were intentionally absent from the session, which temporarily disabled achiev-
ing the supermajority in favor. The issue escalated even further when the possibility 
of a referendum among the Slovenes arose, which could have highly complicated the 
resolution of events and perhaps even prevented the whole process of Croatia’s ac-
cession into the organization. Therefore, the USA got actively involved in crushing 
the Slovenian blockade through its silent diplomacy, which is contained in the De-
marche09STATE20395_a,10 in which other allies, above all France, Germany and Italy, 
were summoned to exert additional pressure to prevent jeopardizing Croatian entry 
into NATO. The pressure resulted in the Slovenian giving in and the successful Croa-
tian entry into organization in 2009. 
9 The Three Seas Initiative has twelve member states and extends from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic 
Sea and the Black Sea: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
10 Secretary of State, „DEMARCHE - SLOVENIAN TIMELINE FOR RATIFICATION OF CROATIA 
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Despite being the NATO and the EU member-state since 2004, Slovenia did not 
limit its disruption of Croatian foreign policy to its unsuccessful blockade of Croatian 
NATO-entry. With the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 due to the Russian 
annexation of Crimean peninsula, the European Union assumed the stance in favor 
of imposing sanctions on Russia. Among the member-states opposing this stance was 
Slovenia, with Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs making a statement in which he 
said that „Slovenia, of all European member-states, has best relations with Russia. The 
relations have traditionally been good, not to mention that Russia is our very impor-
tant economic partner” (Erjavec, 2014). 
For a small country with a population of only 2 million, Slovenia maintained a po-
litical stance towards Russia that was characterized by NATO and the EU as quite dar-
ing. From the perspective of Cohen’s theory of world division (Cohen, 1963), this bal-
ancing of Slovenian allegiance between great powers may be interpreted as a strategic 
move with the aim of positioning Slovenia as a gateway-state that connects important 
geostrategic locations and regions. The territory of former Yugoslavia is, namely, lo-
cated on the convergence of big geostrategic regions of Heartland and Eastern Europe 
with the Mediterranean and the Magreb, as well as on the transit zone from Middle 
to South-Eastern Europe (Kurečić, 2001). Such politics on Slovenian part may also be 
seen as an attempt to impose itself as a mediator between the great powers, which is 
perhaps confirmed by the fact that in 2001 a summit of presidents George W. Bush Jr. 
and Vladimir Putin in the Brdo Castle near Kranj was held.
Another example of this kind of Slovenian foreign policy occurred in 2018, when 
Russian authorities were accused of using the lethal amount of nerve gas to assassinate 
their former secret agent Sergey Skripal in Salisbury, UK. In the events following the 
assassination, Slovenia emerged as one of the nine EU member-states who decided 
not to impose sanctions on Russia that resulted in the expulsion of dozens of Russian 
diplomats from the countries across Europe (Scarsi, 2018). 
Frequent and sophisticated diplomatic activity of Slovenia in favor of Russia led 
to the increasing perception of the country as pro-Russian. This put a pressure on 
the Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Erjavac, who felt the need to frequent-
ly defend himself from such allegations during his February 2018 meeting with his 
Russian colleague Sergey Lavrovin Ljubljana. On that occasion he denied any insin-
uation about him leading a pro-Russian foreign policy and simultaneously affirmed 
that Slovenia must practice balanced foreign policy (Erjavec ob obisku Lavrova, 2018). 
However, the country has continued to oppose the imposition of sanctions on Russia 
within the collective EU bodies and such foreign policy has certainly not made it a 
reliable ally in the region to the USA.
Croatian relations to Russia may be assessed in the context of the USA’s rising in-
fluence in the region. The diplomatic relations between the two countries coldened af-
53Međunarodne studije, god. 19, br. 1–2, 2019, str. 43-61
ter the visit of the Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković to Ukraine in November 
2016, during which he expressed a sympathetic stance towards Ukrainian side in the 
Crimean conflict and offered Croatian help in reintegrating the occupied territories 
that might prove beneficial to the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea (Plenković 
u Ukrajini, 2016). Also, in the two-year period from 2015 to 2017 Croatia did not elect 
its ambassador to Russia (Uoči sastanka Vladimira Putina, 2017). Although an op-
portunity for embittering the diplomatic relations and economic cooperation between 
the two countries opened with the visit of the Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Ki-
tarović to Moscow in 2017, it was not used. 
When it comes to concrete diplomatic actions against Russia, Croatia, in contrast 
to Slovenia, solidarized with the UK after the assassination of Sergey Skripal and ban-
ished one Russian diplomat from its territory. This move provoked brisk reaction of 
the Russian ambassador in Zagreb Anvar Azamov, who described the action as an 
„inimical step” (I u ruskoj ambasadi žestoko reagirali, 2018) and had as a consequence 
the planned corrective visit of Vladimir Putin to Croatia. Furthermore, media clashes 
between the Russian and the American embassy in Croatia are frequent, as are the 
Russian ambassador’s outcries at the foreign political positioning of Croatia and its 
perceivedly inimical stance toward Russia (Ruski ambasador u Hrvatskoj, 2019).
„Spoiling” influence
On the other side, Serbia as the most important Russian player in the region has con-
tinued to express its „strong” intention to become an EU member-state, although, with 
their foreign political stance and moves, their high political officials betray the inten-
tion to mitigate between Russia and the EU. However, when the status of Serbia and 
the whole region among the priorities of Russian foreign policy is at concern, some 
political analysts consider that, despite Russia holding Serbia a valuable ally and an 
amical country, due to cultural and historical circumstances it is primarily viewed by 
Russia as a peripheral state outside of its main strategic focus or a „sleeping resource” 
for that matter (Nelaeva and Semenov, 2016: 69). Conversely, Khotkova (2002: 17) of 
the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies considers the Balkans as a high-priority re-
gion in Russian foreign political enterprises. With Vladimir Putin’s ascension as the 
head of state, a case may be made for Russia’s return to the Balkans, yet according to 
Bechev (2017), Russia never abandoned the region in the first place. 
From the „Western perspective”, the role of Russia in this area is that of a spoiler 
for multiple initiatives. It prevented the solution of the Kosovo crisis, withheld the 
recognition of its independence and used its status as a global power to prevent Koso-
va’s joining of international organizations. When it comes to BiH, it has been prac-
ticing foreign policy that has been in continuous disbalance with that of the West, 
supporting the tendencies and the rhetoric of the head of Bosnian Serbs Milorad 
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Dodik toward secession of the Republika Srpska (Secireu, Bieber and Tzifakis, 2019: 
6). The Republika Srpska and its president Milorad Dodik have thus been affirmed 
as one of the strongest Russian „clients” in the region. By supporting Dodik’s efforts, 
Russia has successfully achieved its spoiling influence for many international initi-
atives with the purpose of centralizing BiH, whereas Dodik returned that favor by 
obstructing the Bosnian way towards the Euro-Atlantic Integrations (Bechev, 2017, 
2019). Russia has skilfully been using its good relations with the head of Bosnian 
Serbs, which helped it nurture its own geopolitical interests. In doing so, Russia has 
repeatedly pointed to the inability of the EU chiefs to solve the persisting problems 
in this red-hot zone and simultaneously created new diplomatic focal points, thus 
solidifying its international reputation that was jeopardized through the annexation 
of Crimea. 
Another attempt at destabilization with the purpose of not solving the existing 
problems in the region was committed by Russia in Macedonia, when it tried to dis-
rupt the negotiations the latter was having with Greece concerning its name (Greece 
orders, 2018). The diplomatic incident resulted in the expulsion of two Russian dip-
lomats from Greece for endangering national security. They were accused of having 
tried to amass confidential information that included the contents of the negotiations 
between Greece and Macedonia. The incident itself and the response of Athens were 
quite harsh and dramatic, which pointed to the severity of the scandal, since Greece 
and Russia had usually maintained good relations. For instance, in the case of Sergey 
Skripal’s assassination, Greece did not join the international action of expulsing Rus-
sian diplomats.
This kind of Russia’s behavior can also be explained as a „payback” for meddling in 
its backyard (Ukraine, Moldova or Gruzia). Russia sees Balkan as a vulnerable periph-
ery of Europe where can create leverage by exploiting weaknesses in Western policies 
for purpose to use it as a bargaining chip for future (Bechev, 2019: 6–7).
„The mythical ally of Serbia”
Of all former Yugoslav member-states Russia’s largest resource resides with Serbia. 
Although the historical relationship between the two countries experienced its vicis-
situdes, Russia remains one of the most important historical allies of the South Slav-
ic country, so that, at least from the Serbian nationalist and traditionalist perspec-
tive, it may be characterized as mythic.The friendly relations between the two states 
were expressed in 2014, when Serbian volunteers joined the pro-Russian forces in 
Ukraine (Secireu, 2019).11 Apart from panslavic sentiments, the friendship between 
11 In contrast to Serbs, Croatian volunteers individually joined the clashes as part of the Ukrainian 
forces.
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the Russians and the Serbs has historically been nurtured by Christian Orthodoxy 
and the connection between the Serbian and the Russian Orthodox Church. As one 
of the most important and most sensitive foreign political issues of Serbia, Kosovo 
was adeptly used by Russia to accomplish their interests in the region. Although, 
from the international legal perspective, a Kosovo – Crimea parallel may be drawn, 
such association has aptly been discarded by the Russians, who have continued to 
unremittingly support Serbia. The reasons behind this, apart from being able to act 
as a disruptive force on the Balkans, may be searched for in the Russian attempt 
to reclaim the influence in Europe they lost after the Crimea War and indirectly 
reproach the EU for being unable to clean their own doormat. This way the Rus-
sians have also managed to maintain Serbia as their loyal ally, since the unresolved 
situation on Kosovo continues to impede Serbian way towards Europe. If the Koso-
vo-Serbian relations normalized through Serbian recognition of the former’s inde-
pendence, Serbia could finally be able to accelerate its integration into the EU and 
distance itself from Russian influence Besides the Kosovo case, Russia has shown 
itself to be a loyal protector of Serbian interests even in the UN Security Council, in 
which it has been acting on the latter’s behalf, for instance, in recently having dis-
played that stance by vetoing the resolution on the Srebrenica massacre on occasion 
of its 20th anniversary.12
Bechev (2015) cited the US State John Kerry, who claimed that countries like Ser-
bia, Kosova, Macedonia and Montenegro were „in the line of fire.” Russian pressure 
on those countries is noticeable through energetics projects that aim to consolidate 
Russian influence over those countries’ regimes. In April 2014, during the anti-es-
tablishment protest in Macedonia, Russian media accused the West of attempting to 
orchestrate another revolution13 and depose a regime that was sympathetic to Russia. 
The Kumanovo clashes14 that happened parallel to the protests in Skopje were used by 
the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov, who, on his visit to Belgrade, accused 
the West of supporting separatism and the creation of „Great Albania” (Bechev, 2015).
Although often portrayed as „a pro-European politician”, Serbian President Vučić 
is well aware of the use the potential EU-membership may provide to Serbia, yet he 
simultaneously craftily uses his country’s relations to Russia as a blackmail lever de-
signed to fasten his country’s integration into the EU. The last truly and most sincerely 
12 In 2007 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) described the acti-
ons of Serbian military in Srebrenica as a genocide. In 2009 the European Parliament declared 11 July 
„The Srebrenica Memorial Day.”
13 It was compared to the Ukrainian one.
14 The Kumanovo clashes are a series of armed incidents that took in May 2015 place in Macedonian 
town of Kumanovo, close to the border to Serbia and Kosovo that. It consisted of shootouts between 
several dozens of Albanian „terrorists” and the Macedonian police.
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pro-Europan politician in contemporary Serbia was Zoran Đinđić, who has been mur-
dered in 2003 while performing the duty of the Serbian Prime Minister. 
The mutual visits of Russian and Serbian presidents, respectively, are frequent and 
receive wide media coverage, For example, Putin’s visit to Serbia in January 2019 was 
described as an event of utmost importance (Putin’s visit to Serbia, 2019) and Vučić’s 
visit to Sochi later that year was viewed as no less significant (President Vučić on a 
one-day visit, 2019). Similarly, their military cooperation and joined military exercis-
es are used as taunting tactics against NATO. The most recent joined Serbo-Russian 
military exercise was held in October 2019 under the name „Slavic Shield” and, as a 
pompous manifestation of Serbo-Russian national brotherhood to which the Russians 
brought their powerful S-400 anti-missile system, it was intended as a show-off to 
NATO and the EU. Although otherwise maybe concluded from what was just stated, 
Serbia has continued to cooperate with NATO and abundantly used the funds of NA-
TO’s Partnership for Peace that in withdrawn sums by far exceeded those provided by 
the Russian military (NATO, 2019).
Despite having initiated the negotiations for EU membership in 2009, Serbia could 
become its member state no sooner than 2025 and then only if it normalizes its rela-
tions to Kosova first (De Munter, 2019). After the EU Summit on 17 October 2019 saw 
France vetoing the initiation of negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania due 
to the change in negotiation terms and conditions (Nielsen, 2019), Vučić hastily signed 
an agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union on 25 October 2019. Immediately 
thereafter he stated that Serbia had no intention of becoming a NATO member, an-
nouncing the planned 2020 declaration of Serbia’s military neutrality. However, his 
statements and actions were only about gaining priority, since the mentioned decla-
ration had already been adopted by Serbia in 2007 (Announcement of Declaration, 
2019), whereas the agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union represented the „so 
unwanted alternative” to the EU-membership. 
In the current state of affairs Russia is the greatest potential winner. In the anal-
ysis of events preceding the 2019 NATO summit Bechev observed the following: „If 
the West is disengaged and lets the region go, then Russia has lots of opportunities 
to get mileage out of the situation.” If Serbia became an EU-member, Russia would 
gain another ally within the Union, alongside Cyprus and Hungary, which would be 
a win-win situation for them. „Serbia will be weak or pro-Russian if they end up in 
the EU, which is no bad outcome for Russia either” (Baker and Vasovic, 2019). Apart 
from donating the outdated aircrafts MIG 29, Russia continued with its activizations 
and secured Russian helicopters Mi-35, H145M and Mi-17. This move provoked the 
American reaction via Matthew Palmer, special American delegate for the Balkans, 
who warned that Serbia risks attracting American sanctions if they purchase Russian 
military armaments (Serbia risks US sanctions, 2019).
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A prospect?
The policies of the US and the EU on the territory of former Yugoslavia is one of con-
ditioning and constant pressures for structural reforms, democratization and liberali-
zation. Such politics facilitated the creation of a series of weaker states, some of which 
may be rendered unfinished experiments (BiH). Especially evident is the American 
influence on the geopolitical reconfiguration of the region, which had as its conse-
quence the repetitive territorial shrinkage of Serbia – Montenegro in 2005, Kosovo in 
2008 (Polović, 2013). Weak countries and failed democracies are a fertile soil for the 
growth of corrupted political regimes. The USA and Russia continue their game of 
power on the territory of former Yugoslavia. A positive effect of American influence 
was the end of the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990’s, which would have been even blood-
ier and more destructive were it not for American help, whereas it provoked Putin’s 
geopolitically realist Russia to establish itself as an unavoidable power player in the 
region. Apart from the strategic energetics investments in the region, it is measured 
in its destabilizing activities on the former Yugoslav territory. Both USA and Russia 
profit from corrupted undemocratic regimes, which easily give way to rising regional 
xenophobia and nationalism (Secireu, Bieber and Tzifakis, 2019: 18). Whereas example 
the Bosnian Serb chief Milorad Dodik keeps his allegiance to Russia, the USA has such 
an ally in Montenegrin Milo Đukanović. The American „acquisition” of Montenegro 
represents the hardest hit to Russian interests and influence in region.
In comparison to other countries in the region, Croatia and Slovenia are more ma-
ture democracies, which may be ascribed to the conditions they received before join-
ing the EU, whereas Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, although NATO members, 
continue experiencing frequent accusations of housing regimes prone to corruption.
Despite being the NATO member, Slovenia frequently acts like a lone wolf and does 
not follow the pro-American politics of the neighboring countries without exception, 
cultivating and developing its political and economic ties with Russia. There is an im-
pression that Croatia, which is described as a stable American ally that participates in 
NATO missions in Afghanistan, Poland and Lithuania, misses prospects of economic 
cooperations with Russia to its own detriment, blindly subscribing to American inter-
ests. Serbia skilfully balances between the EU, the USA and Russia, yet with constant 
pressure of Western powers for democratization and normalization of its relations 
with Kosova. On its part, the young and not enough mature Republic of Kosova enjoys 
the patronage of the USA in need of integration into international associations. This 
way is oftentimes boogeytrapped by Serbia with the enthusiastic help of Russia, which 
continues to exert its spoiling influence in BiH for its own geopolitical benefits. BiH, 
as an incomplete project and European experiment, thus becomes the most serious 
challenge without the clear perspective of progress. The danger for the whole region 
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lies in the halted expansion of the EU and its lack of prospects, which might plunge all 
the above-mentioned countries save for Croatia and Slovenia into an even more dan-
gerous Russo-American, post-Cold War clash of interest in the region.
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SAD protiv Rusije: Igre velikih sila na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije 
Sažetak
Prostor na kojem se nalaze države nastale raspadom bivše Jugoslavije po-
stao je krajem 20. stoljeća područjem sukoba velikih sila, posebice između 
SAD-a i Rusije. No, strategije kojima su dvije velike sile nastojale osigurati 
svoj utjecaj u regiji znatno se razlikuju. Dok su SAD svoj položaj osigu-
rale zahvaljujući važnoj ulozi u okončanju rata u BiH i na Kosovu, te ga 
učvrstile koristeći euroatlantske integracije što je rezultiralo uključivanjem 
novonastalih država (Slovenija, Hrvatska, Albanija) u NATO, Rusija je do-
laskom Putina na vlast kao svoju polugu utjecaja u regiji počela koristiti 
projekte u energetici, zauzevši s njima čvrsto uporište u Srbiji, Crnoj Gori 
te BiH. Eskalacija rusko-američkih tenzija u regiji kulminirala je u Crnoj 
Gori, čiji je bijeg iz sfere ruskog utjecaja, popraćen nizom špijunskih afe-
ra zajamčio veliku diplomatsku pobjedu interesima SAD-a. Nakon ovoga 
međunarodnog incidenta Rusija je regiju počela doživljavati kao poligon za 
ostvarivanje svojeg remetilačkog utjecaja, kojim minira „zapadne“ inicija-
tive za stabilizacijom prostora, (BiH, Kosovo i Makedonija) s ciljem osna-
živanja ruskog geopolitičkog utjecaja u Europi, poljuljanog ukrajinskom 
krizom i aneksijom Krima.  
Ključne riječi: prostor bivše Jugoslavije; velike sile; NATO; Rusija; ru-
sko-američki utjecaj; Jugoistočna Europa.
